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In Europe, the decline in the corporate tax rates has not been reflected in the tax-to-GDP 
ratios. This paper explores to what extent the observed trend can be explained by 
changes in the effective tax burden on corporate income, in the share of total income 
accruing to the corporate sector and in total business income relative to GDP. We 
present an overview of the findings from previous literature, apply the methodology 
developed by Sørensen to decompose the most complete data available on the European 
level and make use of information collected from parallel studies on the effective tax 
burden and corporatization. The results suggest that corporatization is the driving factor 
for the trend observed in corporate tax revenues. 
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1  Introduction 
Between 1982 and 2004, the fall of corporate statutory rates observed in the 
majority of OECD countries did not give rise to a decrease of corporate income tax 
revenues relative to GDP
1. A similar trend can be observed in the European Union 
where, according to European Commission's
2 data for 1995-2005, the decrease in 
statutory rates has not been replicated in the changes of revenues from corporate income 
tax. Notably, in the EU-25, the average top statutory tax rate on corporate income 
dropped from 35.3% in 1995 to 25.3% in 2006. At the same time, the role of corporate 
income tax revenue grew considerably, the share of taxes on corporate income to GDP 
rising from 2.7% in 1995 to 3.3% in 2006. From the policy makers' perspective, it is 
important to understand the drivers behind the corporate income tax revenues and how 
they can influence the choice of the corporate tax rate, the definition of the corporate tax 
base, and the tax treatment of the parts of corporate income. It is generally 
acknowledged that while the list of factors that could potentially explain the corporate 
income rate-revenue paradox is long, the relative importance of all these factors is not 
known yet and should be further studied. In particular, data limitations and lack of 
specific analyses of the developments in the EU were pointed out as being partially the 
cause of the confusion.  
This paper attempts to fill the information gap by providing an overview of the 
findings in economic literature as well as a more detailed picture of the recent 
                                                 
1 Sørensen, P.B. (2006), "Can capital income taxes survive? And should they?", CESifo Economic 
Studies, 53.2: 172-228. 
2 European Commission (2006), "Taxation trends in the European Union". 
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developments in corporate taxation based on the data collected by the European 
Commission in the framework of the annual 'Taxation Trends in the European Union' 
publication.  We base our analysis on the formula of decomposition of tax revenues to 
GDP proposed by Sørensen (2006). A new and innovative feature is the use of 
information on the decomposition of business income. The paper starts with an 
overview of the findings in previous literature. Then the methodology used for the 
analysis is set out (section 3). Finally, the developments at the EU level (section 4) and 
the country level (section 5) are described.  
2  Previous literature 
There exists a substantial body of literature on trends in corporate income tax 
revenues worldwide and a growing number of studies try to put forward explanations 
for the rate-revenue paradox in corporate taxation. While some of the literature focuses 
on providing an overview of the trends (Bond et al. (2000); Griffith and Klemm 
(2004)), a number of studies consider specific sources of variation of corporate tax 
revenues. 
2.1. Systemic characteristics of the corporate tax system  
A first factor considered in the literature relates to traits of the corporate tax 
system. Auerbach (2006b) points out a relatively stable ratio of US federal tax revenues 
from non-financial corporations to GDP. This probably masks a declining ratio of 
corporate profits of these corporations relative to GDP and an increasing average tax 
rate on these profits. He claims that the average corporate tax rate rose steadily between 
1996 and 2003 in large part because of the importance of tax losses, reflecting the 
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses under the corporate income tax and caused by 
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a growing dispersion in profit outcomes among firms (i.e. many firms have losses even 
when the overall rate of profit is not low).  
Creedy and Gemmell (2007) consider to what extent the observed volatility in 
the buoyancy of the corporate tax revenues in the UK in 1992-2004 could be determined 
by the fiscal drag properties of the tax system. Fiscal drag characterises progressive 
income taxes where, as the average income rises, the fixed or income-related 
allowances, and rising marginal tax rates result in a growing share of total income paid 
in income tax. In the analysed case, fiscal drag is describing the pattern of growth of 
corporate tax revenues relative to profits in an unchanged tax regime. Creedy and 
Gemmel show that deductions play an important role in determining the rate of growth 
of corporate tax revenues relative to profits. Moreover, in the case of small companies, 
tax rates and thresholds applied to net profits are shown to have an important impact on 
these companies' revenue elasticity of tax. They point out that since both corporate tax 
buoyancy and corporate tax revenue elasticity are volatile, the volatility of tax revenues 
could be inherent to the tax system itself. They also suggest that while in the long term, 
covering one or more full economic cycles, corporate income tax revenues and profits 
can be expected to grow at a roughly similar rate, provided that no discretionary 
changes take place, the short term corporation tax revenues trend can vary significantly 
depending on the economic situation. They conclude that in consequence, forecasting 
corporate tax revenues is especially difficult in severe economic downturns, when 
corporate losses are pronounced and temporary increases and decreases in the revenue 
elasticity can occur. 
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2.2. Corporatization and income shifting 
An increase in the economic weight of the corporate sector is put forward by 
some studies as a second explanatory factor. Clausing (2006) conducts a systematic 
study of the role of several factors explaining the variation of the size of corporate 
income tax revenues relative to GDP among OECD countries in 1979-2002. The 
analysed factors include statutory tax rate, tax base, corporate profitability, the share of 
corporate sector in GDP, incentives to shift between the individual and corporate 
income tax bases, and international factors. Importantly, the analysis covers both 
countries that experienced an increase as well as those that witnessed a decline of the 
tax-to-GDP ratio. Clausing finds that the tax-to-GDP ratio is greater in countries with 
greater share of corporate sector in the economy and in countries with higher corporate 
profit rate, the latter effect being stronger. She also finds small but statistically 
significant effect of shifting income from the one earned under corporate form to the 
one earned under non-corporate form when the highest personal income tax rate is 
lower than the corporate income tax rate.  
Sørensen (2006) argues that the rate-revenue paradox may be explained by 
increasing corporatization on one hand, itself caused by subsequent decline of certain 
sectors in which non-corporate organizational form dominates, and income shifting 
between personal and corporate income, and base broadening on the other hand. De 
Mooij and Nicodème (2007) argue that the simultaneous decline in corporate tax rates 
and rising tax-to-GDP ratios in Europe may to a large extent be explained by growing 
corporatization and income shifting from personal to corporate income tax. According 
5 
to their findings, since the early 1990s income shifting could have raised the share of 
corporate tax revenue in GDP by some 0.25 percentage points.  
2.3. Corporate profitability and capital income 
A third driver for the corporate income tax rate-revenue paradox referred to in 
the literature is the corporate profit level. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Douglas 
(1990) analyse the impact of tax and profit rates on the decline of the corporate income 
tax revenues in the U.S. (1959-1985) and Canada (1960-1985), respectively. The two 
studies indicate that the decline of the corporate income tax revenues is mainly due to 
the declining corporate profitability, without further addressing the reasons for the 
latter. Analysing the opposite trend, i.e. the increase of UK corporate tax revenues in 
1980-2004 despite the reductions in corporate statutory tax rates, Devereux et al. (2004) 
point out that even during the recession in the early nineties and despite further falls of 
corporate tax revenue, the latter remained at higher levels than in the early eighties, 
when the statutory tax rates were considerably higher. Devereux et al. suggest that the 
main underlying causes for the increase of UK corporate tax revenues, are the widening 
of the corporate income tax base
3, structural changes in the UK economy resulting in 
greater participation of the financial sector, and the increasing profitability of the latter 
around the year 2000
4. However, they suggest that the primary reason for the strength of 
corporate tax revenues could be the rise of corporate profits in GDP. 
                                                 
3 The role of base-broadening tax reforms as an explanation for rising revenues in a sample of 16 OECD 
countries in 1982-2001 is also analysed by Devereux et al. (2002). 
4 Direct evidence on profitability of the non-financial sector provided by Devereux et al. does not confirm 
that profitability could have an impact on the increasing corporate tax revenues. 
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Swiston et al. (2007) consider the role of personal and corporate income tax, 
capital gains and income distribution as factors explaining the vast majority of 
variations of tax revenue. They find that the 2004-2006 increase of the tax-to-GDP-ratio 
in the US is mainly due to growth of corporate profits and capital gains. These two 
determinants of tax revenue each contribute to a 40 percent increase in the tax-to-GDP-
ratio. Swiston et al.'s analysis of time series adjusted for tax policy changes suggests 
that corporate income tax is the most volatile revenue component. They conclude that 
because of capital income volatility over the analysed business cycle, the observed 
surge in tax revenue buoyancy is a temporary phenomenon. 
3  Methodology 
To further consider trends in the corporate income tax revenues, we use the 
approach proposed by Sørensen (2006). The approach is based on a formula that 
decomposes the ratio of corporate income tax revenues to GDP and allows to analyse 
whether the trends in corporate income taxation are caused by a change in the effective 
tax burden on corporate income, a change in the share of total income accruing to the 
corporate sector or a change in total business income relative to GDP. According to the 
formula: 
R/GDP = R/C * C/P * P/GDP 
 
Where R is the total corporate tax revenue; C is the total corporate income; P is 
the total business income; R/C is the tax revenue relative to corporate income; C/P is the 
ratio of corporate income to business income; and P/GDP is the business income share 
of total GDP. 
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The values for both corporate income tax revenues and GDP are extracted from 
Eurostat databases. The values for C and P are directly extracted from the data on the 
implicit tax rates
5 on corporate income and on capital and business income respectively. 
The denominator of the implicit tax rate on corporate income is used as a proxy measure 
of corporate income (C). From the denominator of the implicit tax rate on capital and 
business income, the data relative to income of corporations and active income of 
households is subtracted and used as a proxy measure of business income (P). 
The main advantage of applying the implicit tax rate denominators is threefold: 
First, the formula allows using the same data to compare changes in all three indicators 
that may influence the rate-revenue paradox, i.e. the rate of incorporation, the share of 
total business income in GDP, and the tax revenue relative to corporate income. Second, 
using the implicit tax rate denominators allows decomposing corporate and business 
income. This in turn allows for the analysis of changes in the components of these two 
types of income, a methodology that has not been applied in previous studies. Third, the 
methodology used for the construction of implicit tax rates has been agreed with the 
Member States and implemented in a consistent way. One of the main advantages of the 
backward-looking implicit tax rate indicator is its comparability arising from the 
consistency and harmonised computation of ESA95 national accounts data.
 6 
The use of our approach has several methodological limitations. The implicit tax 
rate indicator measures the average effective tax burden on an approximation of the 
                                                 
5 As calculated in European Commission (2006), "Taxation trends in the European Union". 
6 A comprehensive overview of ITR methodology has been presented in European Commission (2006); A 
comprehensive overview of ITR and other tax indicators is given in: OECD (2000) and European 
Commission (2004). Information on the data used in the analysis can be found Annex I. 
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potentially taxable base in the economy. This potential tax base is comparable across 
countries but does not measure the actual tax base defined in tax legislation. 
Consequently, the divergence between the denominator and the legislative tax base may 
cause additional variations. The Sørensen formula, and in particular the C/P ratio, does 
not allow to find out how much of the increasing role of the corporate sector is due to a 
change in structure and size and how much is related to a change in relative corporate 
profitability. That could be achieved by further decomposition of the C/P ratio. Finally, 
even after taking away passive income, i.e. not taking into account the entire 
denominator of ITR of capital and business income, P still does not allow for a full split 
of the income between individuals and corporations. In particular, unavailability of data 
that splits income for households and income of self-employed is the main drawback of 
working with data at the current level of data aggregation. 
Several earlier studies had been based on a methodological approach similar to 
the one used in our analysis (Weichenrieder (2005), Sørensen (2006), De Mooij and 
Nicodème (2007) and used different data sources. For instance, Sørensen used OECD 
National Accounts data and De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) based their findings on 
data extracted from the Ameco database
7. The data used in our study are taken from 
Eurostat and are based on the harmonised computation of ESA95 national accounts. The 
analysis also draws on the preliminary results obtained from the 'Study on effective tax 
                                                 
7 Sørensen applied the decomposition formula to 7 countries. Additionally, he analysed the net change of 
the corporate tax revenues relative to GDP in 1982 and in 2004 in 14 countries.  
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rates in an enlarged European Union'
8 and the 'Questionnaire on corporatization'
9. 
Recent changes in the ESA95 methodology (and mainly the inclusion of Financial 
intermediate services indirectly measured (FISIM) in the GDP) have resulted in 
important revisions of the relevant time series. However, some countries have not yet 
finished correcting the data. In comparison to previous studies, our analysis covers a 
shorter time span (1995-2004)
10 but a larger group of countries (16 EU Member 
States)
11. 
4  Developments at the EU level 
At the EU level, corporate tax revenues remained relatively stable around the 
level of 3% relative to GDP over the period 1995-2004. On average, the effective tax 
burden
12 on corporate income in the EU has been gradually reduced from 32% in 1998 
to 26% in 2004 and the corporate tax burdens across the EU seem to converge since the 
beginning of the century. The evolution is explained by a reduction in the statutory 
rates, which is only partly compensated by a broadening of the corporate tax base. The 
evolution of the corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income contrasts with the 
overall trend observed in national tax laws in the respective EU countries. The ratio of 
                                                 
8 European Commission (2005), "A study to compute and analyse effective levels of company taxation 
within an enlarged European Union using a model approach based on the Devereux-Griffith 
methodology". 
9 European Commission (2007), "Questionnaire on corporatization". 
10 As set out in Annex I, data limitations apply for Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Sweden. 
11 Belgium - BE, the Czech Republic - CZ, Denmark -DK, Estonia - EE, Spain - ES, France - FR, Italy - 
IT, Lithuania - LT, the Netherlands - NL, Austria - AT, Poland - PL, Portugal - PT, Slovakia - SK, 
Finland- FI, Sweden - SE and the United Kingdom - UK. 
12 Information on the computation of the effective tax burden is presented in annex II. 
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corporate tax revenues to corporate income increased continuously from 21% to 24% 
between 1995 and 2001, in spite of a slight drop of the effective tax burden over the 
same period. After 2001 a similar trend to effective tax burden becomes noticeable, with 
roughly a similar 5 percentage point drop, to a level of 19% in 2004.  










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Corporate tax revenues/GDP Corporate tax revenues/Corporate income
Effective tax burden Corporate tax rate
 
Source: European Commission 
 
Corporate income relative to total business income increased steadily from 1995 
to 2004. Overall, the rate of incorporation was 9 percentage points higher in 2004 than 
in 1995. The ratio of business income to GDP remained fairly stable over the period 
1995-2004, in spite of a slight reduction between 1999 and 2002. Following a minor 
drop in the late 1990s, the rate of incorporation
13 showed a slightly rising trend since 
                                                 
13 The rate of incorporation is defined by 2 indicators: (1) the number of corporations relative to the total 
number of enterprises and (2) the turnover of corporations relative to the turnover of all enterprises. 
11 
2000. The corporate profit share
14 followed the same trend. The ratio of self-employed 
to total employed remained unchanged over the period 1995-2004.  









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Corporate income/Business income Business income/GDP
Corporations/Enterprises Turnover corporations/Enterprises
Self-employed/Total employment Corporate profit share
 
Source: European Commission 
Total business income relative to GDP remained relatively stable between 1995 
and 2004, with a slight drop in 1999. After 1999, total business income relative to GDP 
rose steadily from 26% to 28%, the latter being the initial level between 1995 and 1998. 
The decomposition of the business income sheds light on the developments that took 
place at the EU level. While the corporate income held an increased share in business 
income, the growth rate of other components was lower than that of GDP
15. Thus, the 
increase in business income relative to GDP is mainly due to an increase of corporate 
                                                 
14 The profit share of corporations is calculated as the ratio of gross operating surplus to gross value 
added of corporations. 
15 The developments in net operating surplus and net mixed income of households have to be interpreted 
with caution as some Member States have not yet provided complete information on the separation 
between these items. 
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income, which was stronger than GDP. However, these figures hide important 
fluctuations at the country level, which are further analysed in the next section.  
 
Table (1): Business income (P) and its components in 1995 and 2003 in selected EU 
countries
1 
  1995  2003  1995-2003 










C  Corporate income 
48,7 52,7  8,2 
b2n (S.14-S.15)
3  Net operating surplus of households, self-employed and non-profit institutions




Net mixed income of self-employed 
  36,7 33,7  -8,2 
1 BE, CZ, DK, EE, ES, FR, IT, LT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SK, FI, SE, UK.. 
2 Measured as share of the difference of last year and first year in the value for the first year. 
3 Non-corporate business income = b2n (S.14-S.15) + b3n (S.14-S.15). 
 
5  Developments at the country level 
To shed light on the drivers behind the trend in corporate tax revenues relative to 
GDP at the country level, we look at the developments in each of the components of the 
Sørensen formula: the tax system (R/C), corporatization (C/P) and business income 
(P/GDP) for each country. Subsequently, we look at the overall picture in each of the 
countries to establish whether the change in corporate tax revenues relative to GDP can 
be attributed to one of these factors.
16  
Out of the sixteen countries contained in the data set, eleven countries 
experienced increasing corporate tax revenues relative to GDP (Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the 
UK). The remainder of the countries experienced decreasing corporate tax revenues 
relative to GDP (Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain and Slovakia). 
                                                 
16 More details on the trends at the country level described in this section can be found in annex III. 
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5.1. Corporate tax level (R/C) 
The influence of the corporate tax system is evaluated by comparing the 
evolution of the ratio of corporate tax revenues to corporate income with the trend in the 
effective tax burden. The comparison provides an indication as whether there was a 
change in the tax rate or in the tax base over time. 
Looking at these components, seven countries showed increasing corporate tax 
revenues relative to corporate income (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden). Eight countries reported a decrease in corporate tax revenues 
relative to corporate income (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the UK). Finland reported stable corporate tax 
revenues relative to corporate income.  
For two countries the increase in corporate tax revenues relative to corporate 
income coincides with an increase in the effective corporate tax burden (Austria and 
France). In Spain, the increase in corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income 
coincides with an unchanged effective corporate tax burden. In Finland, constant 
corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income are accompanied by an increase in 
the effective tax burden. All eight countries reporting decreasing tax revenues relative to 
corporate income reported a fall in the effective tax rate (the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the UK).  
For Austria, Poland and the UK, the evolution of the ratio of corporate tax 
revenues to corporate income is proportional with the trend observed for the effective 
tax burden. To some extent, this also applies to Finland: before the turn of the century 
corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income developed in line with the increase 
14 
in the effective tax burden and remained fairly stable in the later years as did the 
effective tax burden. Also Belgium, Denmark, Spain and Sweden experience an 
increase in corporate tax revenues to corporate income, although the effective tax 
burden decreased, except for Spain where it remained stable. France and Portugal are 
confronted with an increasing trend, although important reductions of the effective tax 
burden can be observed at the turn of the century. For Denmark, Sweden and Spain, the 
rise in the effective tax burden is significant, while in the case of Austria, Belgium and 
Finland the impact is rather small. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Italy and the UK experience important reductions in the level of corporate 
taxation. Also the Netherlands are confronted with an important reduction in the ratio 
corporate tax revenues to corporate income, although the effective tax burden did not 
change over the period observed.  
For most countries, the direction of the changes in the effective tax burden 
corresponds to the direction of the changes in corporate tax revenues relative to 
corporate income. The same applies to the comparison of corporate tax revenues 
relative to corporate income with corporate tax revenues relative to GDP. However, for 
one third of the countries this reasoning does not apply. In addition, for the countries 
where this reasoning does apply, the size of the changes in corporate tax revenues 
relative to corporate income cannot explain the relatively moderate effect on the 
corporate tax revenues relative to GDP ratios. 
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Table (2): Corporate taxation in selected EU countries (1995-2004). 
Country  BE  CZ  DK  EE  ES  FR  IT  LT 
R/C  + 0 + - + + -  - 
ETR
1  - - - - 0  + - - 
Country  NL  AT  PL  PT  SK  FI  SE  UK 
R/C  - + - + - 0 + - 
ETR  0 + - - - + + - 
"+": increase   "0": constant   "-": decrease 
1 ETR : effective tax burden. 
 
5.2. Corporatization (C/P) 
The evolution of the ratio of corporate income to total business income is 
compared with other trends observed in corporatization, measured by corporate profit 
shares, the ratio of self-employed to total employment as well as the share of business 
activity performed under corporate form (incorporation), both in terms of number of 
corporations and their turnover
17. The comparison provides some information on 
changes in the size of the corporate sector and corporate profitability over time. 
Thirteen countries showed increasing corporate income relative to total business 
income (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK). For eight
18 of these 
countries the increase in corporate income to total business income coincides with an 
increase in either the rate of incorporation (Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, and the Netherlands) or corporate profit share (Belgium and Poland). 
                                                 
17 The information on the rate of incorporation is taken from European Commission (2007), 
"Questionnaire on corporatization". Further details can be found in annex IV. 
18 Note missing data on the rate of incorporation for Belgium, Spain, Poland, Portugal and the UK. 
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For three countries (Italy, Lithuania and Sweden) there is no clear trend in the rate of 
incorporation
19 and for one country (Estonia), the rate of incorporation decreased.  
Three countries reported a decrease in corporate income relative to total 
business income (Portugal, Slovakia and Spain). Two of these countries experience also 
a decrease in the rate of incorporation (Portugal, Spain), while one country reported an 
increase in the rate of incorporation (Slovakia). 
The increase in corporate income relative to total business income was strong in 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK. The decrease in corporate income relative to 
total business income was strong Slovakia. For Austria and Denmark, the evolution of 
the ratio corporate income to total business income is proportional with the 
development of the share of the corporate sector in terms of numbers and turnover. To a 
lesser extent, this also applies to Finland and Poland. For the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Lithuania and Poland the rise in the share of the corporate sector is significant, 
while in the case of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia and 
Sweden, this trend is rather weak. For Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the UK the increasing corporatization is 
accompanied by a reduction in the ratio self-employed to total employment and for 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Lithuania and Slovakia by an increase in the corporate 
profit share. Lithuania experiences a significant increase in corporate profit share 
despite a reduction in the corporate share in terms of the number of corporations. 
                                                 
19 For Italy, the rate of incorporation increased in terms of number of corporations and decreased in terms 
of turnover of corporations, while for Lithuania and Sweden, it is the opposite. 
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Estonia reports a modest reduction in the rate of incorporation and in the ratio of self-
employment to total employed as well as a constant profit share, in spite of a significant 
reduction in the corporate share in terms of the number of corporations. The Czech 
Republic and Portugal are confronted with a modest decline in corporate profit share
20. 
Spain reported a declining ratio of self-employment to total employed as well as a 
constant profit share, in spite of a modest reduction of corporate income relative to total 
business income. The results for Sweden indicate that corporate income relative to total 
business income and the ratio of self-employed to total employed increased, while the 
level of corporatization remained stable. 
TABLE (3): Corporatization in selected EU countries (1995-2004). 
Country  BE  CZ  DK  EE  ES  FR  IT  LT 
C/P +  +  +  +  -  +  +  + 
Corporations/Enterprises     +  +  -    +  +  - 
Turnover Corporations/Enterprises     +  +  -    +  -  + 
Corporate Profit share  +  -  0  0  0  0  0  + 
Self-employed/Total employment -  -  -  +  -    -  - 
Country  NL  AT  PL  PT  SK  FI  SE  UK 
C/P +  +  +  -  -  +  +  + 
Corporations/Enterprises    +  +    +  +  -  
Turnover Corporations/Enterprises   +  +      +  +  +   
Corporate Profit share  0  +  +  0  +  0     
Self-employed/Total employment  0 0 0 + + - 0 - 
"+": increase   "0": constant   "-": decrease  
 
Another way to look at corporatization is by analysing the evolution of the share 
of corporate income in total business income. In Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and the UK, corporate 
                                                 
20 Calculated as the ratio of gross operating surplus to gross value added of corporations. 
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income accounts for the bulk of the business income
21. The growth of the corporate 
share in total business income was accompanied by a relative decline of the share of the 
non-corporate sector. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia; Italy and Lithuania, the 
corporate share overtook the non-corporate share over the period observed. The Czech 
Republic, Estonia, the Netherlands and the UK experienced also an increase in business 
income from households and Italy reported an increase in mixed income. In France, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Sweden the share of non-corporate income 
accounts for the bulk of the business income. The growth of the share of non-corporate 
income in total business income was accompanied by a relative decline of the share of 
the corporate sector in Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Sweden. In Slovakia and Sweden, 
the non-corporate share overtook the corporate share over the period observed. In 
France and Poland, the growth of the corporate share in total business income was 
accompanied by a relative decline of the share of the non-corporate sector. 
In Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland and the UK, corporate income grew at a higher rate than GDP. 
The growth of corporate income was accompanied by a growth of non-corporate income 
at a rate slower than GDP in Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania and the Netherlands. In 
Austria, both corporate and non-corporate income grew faster than GDP, but growth in 
corporate income was stronger. The Czech Republic and the UK also reported an 
increase of income from households, which was stronger than GDP growth. In the case 
of Italy, Portugal Slovakia, Spain and Sweden, corporate income grew at a slower pace 
                                                 
21 In 1995, corporate income in Italy and Sweden represented respectively 40% and over 60% of total 
business income. 
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than GDP, while non-corporate income grew faster than GDP, except for Portugal. For 
France, corporate income grew at a faster rate than GDP. However, the growth of the 
income from households was somewhat higher than the growth of corporate income.  
5.3. Evolution of total business income in the economy (P/GDP) 
Six countries show increasing business income relative to GDP (Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands and Poland). Seven countries do 
report decreasing business income relative to GDP (Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain and Sweden). In three countries, business income relative to GDP 
remained fairly constant (Denmark, France and the UK).  
Some interesting insights on the underlying trends can be derived from a 
comparison of the growth rates of total business income to GDP growth.
22  
Of the countries experiencing an increasing share of total business income over 
the period observed, the Czech Republic and Poland report consistently higher growth 
rates than GDP since the turn of the century. Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Austria enjoy a particularly high growth rate in the first half of the period observed, 
while at the end of the period growth in total business income becomes weaker than 
GDP growth.. The Netherlands even record a negative growth rate for the last part of 
the period observed.  
Of the countries experiencing a decreasing share of total business income over 
the period observed, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden report the growth rates 
of business income to be consistently lower than GDP. On the other hand, Lithuania and 
                                                 
22 Information on the growth rates of corporate tax revenues (R), corporate income (C), business income 
(P) and GDP at the country level can be found in annex V. 
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Slovakia display particularly high growth rates, exceeding GDP growth at the turn of 
the century. For the Netherlands and Sweden, negative growth rates are visible towards 
the end of the period. France and the UK moved from relatively high growth rates 
compared to GDP in the beginning of the period to negative growth rates at the end of 
the period, while Denmark recorded higher growth rates than GDP until the last part of 
the period observed. Overall the effects of the changes in the ratio of total business 
income relative to GDP are relatively modest, except for Estonia, Finland, Spain and 
Sweden 
5.4. Overall assessment 
Austria experiences a minor increase in all components: corporate tax revenues 
to corporate income, as well as the level of corporatization and total business income 
relative to GDP. In Slovakia, we observe a decrease in all components. The relative 
decrease in corporate tax revenues to corporate income and the level of corporatization 
are more important than the decrease in the share of total business income relative to 
GDP.  Denmark and France experience an increase in corporate tax revenues relative to 
corporate income as well as in the level of corporatization, while total business income 
remains stable relative to GDP. In Denmark the increase in the level of corporatization 
is strong, compared to the situation in France. In France, after 1998, a slight increase of 
corporate income relative to business income and an increase in the rate of 
incorporation suggest a relative strengthening of the corporate sector.  
In the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Netherlands and Poland, the level of 
corporatization and total business income as a share of GDP increases. In the Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands and Poland the impact of corporatization is more important 
than the developments in total business income, as opposed to Estonia, where both 
21 
effects are strong. All four countries experience a decline in corporate tax revenues 
relative to corporate income. In the Czech Republic this decline is less important than in 
the other countries. In Spain and Portugal, both the level of corporatization and total 
business income as a share of GDP decline. In Portugal, the decrease in the level of 
corporatization is strong, compared to the situation in Spain. In Spain, the decrease in 
the share of total business income relative to GDP is stronger than in Portugal. Both 
countries enjoy an increase in corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income.  In 
Italy and Lithuania, a strong increase in the level of corporatization is accompanied by a 
reduction in both corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income and total business 
income as a share of GDP. In both countries the reduction in corporate tax revenues 
relative to corporate income is important. The decrease in the share of total business 
income in GDP is stronger for Italy than for Lithuania. 
In Belgium and Sweden, both the level of corporatization and corporate tax 
revenues relative to corporate income increase, while the share of total business income 
relative to GDP decreases. In Sweden, the decline in the share of total business income 
relative to GDP is more important than in Belgium. In Finland, the level of 
corporatization as well as the share of total business income relative to GDP increase, 
while corporate tax revenues remain stable relative to corporate income. In the UK, 
corporatization increases, while the share of total business income relative to GDP 
remained stable and corporate tax revenues relative to corporate income decreases. 
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Table (4): Country overview of the trends in relevant economic and tax indicators 
(1995-2004). 
Country  R/C  C/P  P/GDP 
BE  + +  - 
CZ  - + + 
DK  +  +  0 
EE  -  +  + 
ES  +  -  - 
FR  +  +  0 
IT  -  +  - 
LT  -  +  - 
NL  -  +  + 
AT  +  +  + 
PL  -  +  + 
PT  +  -  - 
SK  -  -  - 
FI  0  +  + 
SE  +  +  - 
UK  -  +  0 
"+": increase   "0": constant   "-": decrease   
 
6  Conclusions 
Although the corporate tax revenues to GDP ratio remained relatively stable 
over the analysed period for most of the countries analysed, changes in the underlying 
drivers can be observed. Interestingly, there is no single pattern in the EU, which 
indicates that there still exists a large economic divergence across EU Member States.  
The results of our analysis indicate that corporatization is the driving factor for 
the trends observed in corporate tax revenues. Without the effect of corporatization, the 
revenue effects relative to GDP cannot be explained by the trend in corporate tax 
revenues to corporate income. These results partially confirm the findings of Sørensen 
23 
(2006) and De Mooij and Nicodème (2007).
23 The presented data also indicate that an 
overall slight rise in corporate income relative to GDP was accompanied by a strong fall 
in non-corporate business income. The decline in corporate tax revenues relative to 
corporate income in several countries may indicate that the impact of tax base 
broadening measures, in countries where such measures were introduced, might have 
not fully compensated for the decrease in statutory tax rates. Corporatization is more 
pronounced than the trends in tax burden and business income relative to GDP.  
This is a first study presenting the most complete data of this type available for a 
large number of EU countries. The main drawback of the analysis is that the data are 
still characterised by a high level of aggregation.  
Our analysis does not allow to assess the relative importance of the causes of 
corporatization, such as the share of economic activity performed under the corporate 
form, profitability of firms, and income shifting. Further research and desagregation of 
the data are necessary to draw conclusions on the role of the incentives to shift taxes 
between individual and corporate income, the importance of the developments in the 




                                                 
23 A summary comparison of results obtained by Sørensen (2006), De Mooij and Nicodème (2006) and 
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Annex I: Definitions 
 
S.14    Households (individuals, group of individuals as consumers, 
entrepreneurs producing market goods and financial and non-financial 
services); includes, among others, S.141 + S.142 (employers and own 
account workers) 
S.15     Non-profit  institutions  serving  households 
 
ITR on corporate income    Denominator: net operating surplus of corporations  
+ interests (d41), rents on land (d45), dividends (d42), insurance 
property income attributed to policy holders (d44) of non-financial 
and financial corporations (all paid minus received) 
        + dividends received by general government and rest of the world 
    +  dividends  received  by  S.14-S.15 
ITR  on  capital  income  Denominator: denominator of ITR on corporate income + 
denominator of ITR on capital and business income of households, the 
latter denominator includes: 
+ interests (d41), rents on land (d45), dividends (d42), insurance 
property income attributed to policy holders (d44) (all paid minus 
received) 
+ dividends (d42) received by general government and rest of the 
world 
        + dividends (d42) received by S.14-S.15 
+ rents of private households, net operating surplus of non-profit 
institutions, net mixed income of self-employed 
+ interests (d41) and rents on land (d45) of households and non-profit 
organisations (all paid minus received) 
+ insurance property income attributed to policy holders (d44) 
received by households and non-profit organisations 
Operating  surplus    the surplus (or deficit) on production activities before account has 
been taken of the interest, rents or charges paid or received for the use 
of assets.  
Net operating surplus     operating surplus minus consumption of fixed capital 
Mixed  income    the remuneration for the work carried out by the owner (or by 
members of his family) of an unincorporated enterprise. This is 
referred to as 'mixed income' since it cannot be distinguished from the 
entrepreneurial profit of the owner.  
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Annex II: Effective tax burden  
The methodology used for the calculation of the effective tax burden is set out 
by Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), and has also been used in an earlier study by the 
European Commission in 2001 (Company Tax Study)
24. The effective tax burden 
considered in the analysis is the 'effective average tax rate' (EATR), which identifies the 
effect of taxation on discrete location choices. Corporation taxes are the only taxes 
taken into account. 
The effective tax rate (ETR) is a forward-looking indicator defined as the 
proportionate difference of the net present value of a profitable investment project in the 
absence of tax and the net present value of the same investment in the presence of tax. 
The impact of taxation depends on a number of features of the tax system, including the 
statutory tax rate, capital allowances, wealth taxes paid by the company, as well as 
possibly the treatment at the corporate level of dividends paid by the company. The 
ETR considers corporate taxation on domestic investments only. 
It is important to note that the effective tax rate (ETR) approximates the tax base 
by considering the capital allowances for investment in a number of typical assets. The 
measure does not aim to take into account all aspects of the tax base. In particular, the 
treatment of losses is not captured in the calculations. 
The measure presented here should also be distinguished from backward-looking 
approaches, as derived from published data on tax payments, either from company 
                                                 
24 The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper Series No. W98/16 (1998), 'The taxation of discrete 
investment choices' (Michael P. Devereux/Rachel Griffith) 
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accounting records or from tax receipts. The latter offer the advantage that they are 
based on real-life data, but are subject to a number of limitations when analysing 
investment decisions: time lags in information and a lack of framework to distinguish 
between economic effects and tax effects, and the absence of a time perspective. 
Effective tax rates are available for all countries considered over the period 
1995-2004. 
Effective corporate tax burden on investment (1995-2004) 
ETR 
(%) 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
BE  35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 30 30 
CZ  33 32 32 26 25 24 24 24 24 25 
DK  30 30 30 30 28 28 27 27 27 27 
EE  22 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 20 20 
ES  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
FR  33 36 36 40 38 37 36 35 35 35 
IT  48 48 48 37 37 36 36 34 33 32 
LT  23 23 23 23 23 19 19 13 13 13 
NL  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
AT  29 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 
PL  36 36 34 32 31 27 25 25 24 17 
PT  35 35 35 34 34 32 32 30 29 25 
SK  37 37 37 37 37 26 26 22 22 17 
FI  23 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 27 
SE  24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 
UK  31 31 31 30 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Average
1  32 32 32 31 30 29 29 28 27 26 
Source: European Commission (2005) ,'A study to compute and analyse effective levels of company taxation within an enlarged 
European Union using a model approach based on the Devereux-Griffith methodology' 
1. Only countries in the table. 
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Annex III: The Sørensen approach 
The ratios R/GDP, R/C, C/P and P/GDP were computed for 16 countries 
contributing to around 70% of EU-25 GDP (68% in 1995 and 73% in 2003). For R, the 
data cover the time span 1995-2004 except for Portugal and Slovakia where the last 
available year is 2003. For C and P, the data cover the time span 1995-2004 except for 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal and Slovakia where the last available year is 
2003, and for Sweden where the last available year is 2002. 
The corporate profit shares were calculated for 14 countries. For Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, 
Slovakia and Finland, the data cover the time span 1999-2004. For Spain, the data cover 
the time span 2000-2004, for Portugal 2000-2003 and for Estonia 2000-2002. For 
Sweden and the UK, the data were not available.  
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Annex IV: The questionnaire on corporatization 
Data were collected for 11 countries on the basis of an ad-hoc survey. Belgium, Spain, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK had not replied to the questionnaire. Except for Austria, Italy, Denmark and France, 
data were obtained for the time span 1995-2004. 
Number of corporations as a percentage of total 
enterprises
* 




1996  2005  Change   1996  2005  change 
CZ  15,59 23,50 7,91  82,50 92,30 9,80 
DK  31,05 35,58 4,53  83,00 86,30 3,30 
EE  71,22 43,87 -27,35  100  99,20 -0,80 
FR  44,19 49,92 5,73  91,00 92,00 1,00 
IT  13,78 15,61 +1,83 81,33 79,13 -2,20 
LT  39,73 22,90 -16,83  67,20 75,80 8,60 
NL  24,17 25,83 1,66  86,30 87,20 0,90 
AT  15,70 15,92 0,22  72,00 74,00 2,00 
SK  10,98 17,13 6,15  71,40 71,70 0,30 
FI  40,25 44,38 4,13  90,69 91,69 1,00 
SE  70,59 47,57 -  23,02  95,  10  96,30 1,20 
Source: European Commission (2007), 'Questionnaire on corporatization'.  
* The period considered for Estonia, Lithuania and Sweden was 1996-2004, for Austria and Italy 1996-2003. For Denmark, the 
period considered was 1999-2004, for France 2000-2004. 
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Annex V: Average nominal growth rates of corporate income (C), business income 
(P), corporate tax revenues (R) and GDP 
 
    1996-1998  1999-2001  2002-2004 
BE  C  2.47% 7.11% 6.26% 
  P  -0.02% 3.42% 0.94% 
  R  14.89% 1.67% 4.75% 
  GDP  1.61% 4.34% 4.61% 
CZ  C  9.08% 11.85% 20.88% 
  P  8.83% 8.78%  17.15% 
  R  -0.25% 15.50% 26.72% 
  GDP  9.54% 7.72%  13.00% 
DK  C  0.45% 12.69%  0.19% 
  P  5.35% 8.32% 3.12% 
  R  12.95% 5.52% 3.76% 
  GDP  3.70% 4.93% 4.36% 
EE  C  41.52% 25.87% 16.80% 
  P  32.15% 16.73% 13.78% 
  R  24.22% -24.32%  43.05% 
  GDP  20.04% 11.86% 15.66% 
GR  C  0.52% 10.92% 17.50% 
  P  3.28% 4.45% 9.42% 
  R  14.11% 15.19% -0.60% 
  GDP  6.69% 6.90%  10.22% 
ES  C  5.06% -3.55%  7.55% 
  P  4.18% 3.20% 5.43% 
  R  17.75% 13.22% 14.09% 
  GDP  5.57% 8.23%  10.12% 
FR  C  7.30% 2.90% 3.42% 
  P  6.39% 3.90%  -1.39% 
  R  13.03% 14.23%  0.39% 
  GDP  3.11% 4.39% 4.82% 
IT  C  8.60% 5.72% 2.24% 
  P  6.30% -3.78%  0.63% 
  R  2.88% 16.42%  1.97% 
  GDP  8.20% 4.73% 5.29% 
LT  C  24.17% 26.60% 27.92% 
  P  19.57% 15.61% 16.33% 
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  R  7.57% -16.39%  69.95% 
  GDP  26.59% 11.06% 13.74% 
NL  C  10.66% 15.52%  5.25% 
  P  18.00% 9.60%  -2.14% 
  R  15.94% 5.24%  -2.45% 
  GDP  3.94% 7.56% 5.51% 
AT  C  8.96% 3.23% 4.90% 
  P  5.20% 4.59% 1.89% 
  R  15.65% 18.43%  7.33% 
  GDP  1.43% 4.16% 3.88% 
PL  C  15.18% 5.90%  25.02% 
  P  10.95% 11.76%  4.35% 
  R  11.37% 0.78% 2.29% 
  GDP  13.01% 11.61%  3.52% 
PT  C  8.80% -4.62%  16.84% 
  P  4.54% 0.80% 3.24% 
  R  17.79% 10.13% -3.00% 
  GDP  6.71% 6.93% 5.44% 
SK  C  -16.13% 22.85% 21.76% 
  P  2.69% 12.35% 14.79% 
  R  -8.08% -5.74%  9.66% 
  GDP  9.91% 5.91%  15.32% 
FI  C  18.09% 17.84%  4.33% 
  P  12.51% 14.92%  3.37% 
  R  29.67% 9.21%  -10.76% 
  GDP  5.26% 6.32% 4.77% 
SE  C  -3.42% -3.90%  -17.94% 
  P  2.44% -1.08%  -12.57% 
  R  5.78% 9.16% 1.47% 
  GDP  5.28% 3.76% 2.45% 
UK  C  20.87% 1.96%  10.14% 
  P  27.19% 3.38%  -6.52% 
  R  28.16% 4.04%  -3.33% 
  GDP  13.83% 8.10% 3.63% 
Source: European Commission (2006), 'Taxation trends in the European Union' 
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Annex VI: Comparison with previous studies 
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11   CHANGE 
12  CHANGE 
12  CHANGE 
12 
EU  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  +  -  N/A  -  - 
BE  +  +  +  +  +  +  -  stable  -  +  stable  + 
CZ  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  - 
DE  -  +  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  stable  N/A  N/A  stable  N/A 
DK  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  stable  +  +  stable  + 
GR  +  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
EE  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  - 
ES  +  +  -  N/A  -  -  N/A  stable  -  N/A  +  + 
IE  +  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  stable  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
FR  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  -  stable  + 
IT  -  +  +  0 (?)  -  +  0 (?)  stable  -  +  stable  - 
LT  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  - 
LU  -  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
NL  +  +  -  +  +  +  0 (?)  stable  +  +  stable  - 
AT  +  +  +  N/A  +  +  N/A  +  +  N/A  stable  + 
PL  N/A  -  +  N/A  -  +  N/A  stable  +  N/A  stable  - 
PT  N/A  N/A  +  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  -  + 
SK  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  -  N/A  N/A  - 
FI  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
SE  +  +  +  N/A  +  +  -  stable  -  N/A  stable  - 
UK  -  +  +  -  ?  -  0 (?)  stable  +  -  -  + 
Source:  Sørensen (2006), De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) and own calculations. 
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(1) Sørensen (2006), primary data source: OECD; profit is the operating surplus defined as profit gross of interest and depreciation 
(2) De Mooij and Nicodème (2007), primary data source: AMECO database based on Eurostat data; C is the total gross operating 
profits of corporations, P is the total gross operating profit in the economy. 
(3) Data source: denominators on ITR on corporate and capital income (the Structures) based on Eurostat data. 
(4) Except for PL 1995-2004. 
(5) Except for SK where the last available year is 2003. 
(6) Except for BE 1986-2002; DK 1981-2001; UK 1988-2003. 
(7) Except for UK 1987-2004; SE 1994-2004; ES, PL, AT 1995-2004; BE 1985-2004. 
(8) Except for CZ, DK, EE, PT, UK where the last available year is 2003. 
(9) Except for DE, PL 1991-2004, and EU 25 average 1995-2003.  
(10) Except for DE 1991-2004,  Nicodème EU 25 average 1995-2003. 
(11) For Sørensen, last available year to first available year as seen in the graphs presented in the paper; for De Mooij and Nicodème 
(2007), last available year to first available year as seen in the graphs presented in the paper; for the current study, last year available 
to first year available, and EU average computed for 20 countries: BE, CZ, DK, EE, GR, ES, FR, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, NL, AT, PL, 
PT, SK, FI, SE, UK. 
(11) For Sørensen, last available year to first available year as seen in the graphs presented in the paper (three-year moving 
averages); for De Mooij and Nicodème (2007), presumably last year to first available year as commented by the authors in the paper 
(own interpretation of the graphs presented in their paper in case of C/P for PL, SE and UK, in case of P/GDP for EU 25 average 
and in case of R/C for EU 25 average); for the current study, last year available to first year available, and EU average computed for 
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